In this note we show that the intuitionistic theory of polynomial induction on Π b+ 1 -formulas does not imply the intuitionistic theory IS 1 2 of polynomial induction on Σ b+ 1 -formulas. We also show the converse assuming the Polynomial Hierarchy does not collapse. Similar results hold also for length induction in place of polynomial induction. We also investigate the relation between various other intuitionistic first-order theories of bounded arithmetic. Our method is mostly semantical, we use Kripke models of the theories.
Introduction
In [B1] , Buss introduced some particular first-order theories of bounded arithmetic. The language of these theories extends the usual language of arithmetic by adding function symbols
rounded down to the nearest integer), |x| (=the number of digits in the binary notation for x) and # (x#y = 2 |x||y| ). The set BASIC of basic axioms for the theories of bounded arithmetic is a finite set of (universal closures of) quantifier-free formulas expressing basic properties of the relations and functions of the language.
The set of sharply bounded formulas is the set of bounded formulas which all quantifiers occurring in them are sharply bounded quantifiers, i.e. of the form ∃x |t| or ∀x |t| where t is a term not involving x.
Following Buss [B1] , we define a hierarchy of bounded formulas: The most important theory among the theories of bounded arithmetic is S 
The main reason is the following theorem. Note that a function f is said to be Σ 
The following theorem will be used throughout this paper.
Theorem 0.2 The following theories are equivalent to S 1 2 :
Proof See [B1] and [B4] . and →. This theory was introduced and studied by Cook and Urquhart and by Buss (see [CU] and [B3] ∀xφ(x, f (x)).
The theory IS
Note that, in part (ii) above, the symbol f in the formula does not belong to the given language; however by part (i), it can be expressed in our language. The theory P V is an equational theory of polynomial time functions introduced by Cook, P V 1 is its (conservative) extension to classical first-order logic and IP V is the intuitionistic theory of P V plus polynomial induction on N P formulas. Here an N Pformula is a formula equivalent to an atomic formula (in the language of P V ) followed by a number of bounded existential quantifiers (see [CU] ). The N P -formulas represent precisely the N P relations in the standard model. coN P -formulas are defined dually.
Our main results in this paper are that over a natural intuitionistic base theory (i.e., the intuitionistic deductive closure of BASIC), coN P induction does not imply N P induction; and that assuming the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse, neither does N P induction imply coN P induction. This is in sharp contrast to the case for classical logic, in which the two principles are equivalent.
Kripke models of intuitionistic bounded arithmetic
Here we briefly describe Kripke models. All theories we will study prove the principle of excluded middle P EM for atomic formulas and so we can use a slightly simpler version of the definition of Kripke models, see [V] .
A Kripke structure for a language L can be considered as a set of classical structures for L partially ordered by the relation substructure. We can assume without loss of generality that this partially ordered set is a rooted tree. For every node α, L α denotes the expansion of L by adding constants for elements of M α . The forcing relation is defined inductively as follows:
• M α ϕ ∧ ψ if and only if M α ϕ and M α ψ;
• M α ∀xϕ(x) if and only if for all β ≥ α and all a ∈ M β , M β ϕ(a);
• M α ∃xϕ(x) if and only if there exists a ∈ M α such that M α ϕ(a). By IBASIC we mean the intuitionstic theory axiomatized by BASIC axioms. Lemma 1.1 Kripke models of IBASIC are exactly BASIC-normal Kripke models.
Proof Using the fact that atomic formulas are decidable in IBASIC ( [B3, Th.3] ) and this theory is universal, the proof is straightforward.
It is well-known and easy to prove that a Kripke model is ∆ 0 -elementary extension (that is, its accessible relation is ∆ 0 -extension) if and only if forcing and satisfaction of bounded formulas in each node (world) of it are equivalent if and only if, it decides bounded formulas. The following states a similar result for sharply bounded formulas. Proof Let A and K be as above. We use induction on the complexity of A to prove the desired property. For atomic formulas this is obvious by definition of forcing. In the induction step, there are four cases ∨, ∧, bounded existential quantifier and sharply bounded universal quantifier. We just treat one part of the last case. The others are easy.
∀x ≤ |t(a)|A(x, a), using the induction hypotheses, it is enough to show that this formula is satisfied in any node β above α. But this can be easily verified by the assumption that the Kripke model is a weak end extension Kripke model. Proof Using the definition of forcing, the proof is straightforward. However, we sketch the proof. Suppose K is an S 
N P −PIND versus coN P -PIND
In this section we use the basic results on Kripke models proved in Section 1 to compare the intuitionistic theories based on various schemes of induction on N P and coN P formulas.
In the following theorem, we use [J1] . In [J1] and [J2] , a model of the theory S 0 2 (the classical theory axiomatized by BASIC plus P IN D on sharply bounded formulas) was constructed to witness a famous independence result of G. Takeuti [T] , i.e. S Proof If M ⊆ N are models of BASIC and N is a weak end extension of M , M is said to be length-initial in N by [J1] . Also, in [J1] , for a special model M S [A, Th. 3.17] ) and so if the Kripke model forces IS 1 2 , using forcing definition, its root would be a model of ∀x, y∃z ≤ x(x−y = z).
In the theory IP V which is the natural conservative extension of IS 1 2 to the language of P V , any Σ b+ 1 formula is equivalent to an atomic formula (in the language of P V ) followed by a number of bounded existential quantifiers (see [CU] ).
Below, an N P formula is such a formula and a coN P formula is a P V -atomic formula followed by a number of bounded universal quantifiers. ¬¬N P -formulas are doubly negated N P -formulas. The theory IP V can be axiomatized by P V plus N P − P IN D, see [B2] .
In general, the negative translation of a formula is obtained by replacing any subformula of the form ψ ∨ η, resp. ∃xψ, by ¬(¬ψ ∧ ¬η), resp. ¬∀x¬ψ and inserting ¬¬ in front of all atomic sub-formulas, except ⊥. If T c ϕ, then the set of negative translations of the formulas in T , intuitionistically proves the negative translation of ϕ, i.e. ϕ − , see [TD] .
In the following, the notation ≡ i between two sets of formulas is used to show that they have the same intuitionistic consequences. Also, i denotes provability in intuitionistic (first-order) logic.
Proposition 2.2 We have
Proof We just prove the case (i). The other can be proved similarly.
First observe that the two theories are classically equivalent (see [B4] and note that in the presence of P V one has access to all polynomial time functions). Now, to obtain the desired intuitionistic equivalence, note that both intuitionistic theories are obviously closed under the negative translation.
The replacement (bounded collection) axiom on a formula ϕ(x, y) is:
where s and t are arbitrary terms and SqBd(s, t) is a term which, roughly speaking, estimates the size of the sequence (s, t).
This axiom, which is called BB, enables us to interchange sharply bounded quantifiers with bounded quantifiers. S 1 2 proves the above scheme for any Σ b 1 -formula ϕ (see [B1, Th. 2.7 .14]). Theorem 2.3 We have
Proof (i) We argue informally in P V + coN P − IN D and prove P V + ¬¬N P − IN D. Let A(x, y) be atomic and assume:
(a) ∀x(¬¬∃y tA(x, y) → ¬¬∃y tA(x + 1, y)) and (b) ¬∃y tA(a, y) for some (term) a.
Using (a) and (b), one obtains coN P − IN D on the formula ∀z a(x + z = a → ∀y t¬A(z, y)) and so ∀x∀z a(x + z = a → ∀y t¬A(z, y)). Putting x = a, one gets ¬∃y tA(0, y)). What we have done is proved ¬∃y tA(0, y)) from (a) and (b). So, indeed, we proved the instance of IN D on the formula ¬¬∃y tA(x, y). Note that atomic formulas are decidable in P V extended to intuitionistic logic and so in this theory ¬∀y tA(a, y) ≡ i ¬¬∃y t¬A(a, y).
Now we prove
We want to prove the sentence ∀xC(x) where C(x) is the formula ∀z |a|(x+z = a → ¬¬∃y t¬A(z, y)). First observe that C(x) is equivalent in IP V to a doubly negated N P formula. For this it is enough to use the negative translation of Σ b 1 -replacement scheme which is provable in P V + ¬¬N P − IN D. The rest of the proof is similar to the former case.
(ii) A suitable version of the proof of (i) will work. To prove P V + coN P − LIN D i P V + ¬¬N P − LIN D, in assumption (b) consider the sentence ¬∃y tA(|a|, y) for some (term) a, and also consider the formula ∀z a(x + z = |a| → ∀y t¬A(z, y)) as B(x). To prove P V + ¬¬N P − LIN D i P V + coN P − LIN D, make similar changes.
(iii) This is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2.2 and part (ii).
Recall that the theory CP V is the classical closure of IP V and P V 1 is P V conservatively extended to first-order logic. It is known that, under the assumption CP V = P V 1 , the polynomial hierarchy collapses, by a result of Krajicek, Pudlak and Takeuti (see [KPT] ). Using the original construction, Buss, and independently Zambella, showed that if CP V = P V 1 , then CP V proves a weaker form of the collapse (see [B5] and [Z] ).
Theorem 2.4 If each of the following cases occurs, then CP V = P V 1 :
Proof We just prove case (i). The other is proved similarly.
(i) Assume IP V coN P − P IN D. Any ω-chain of (classical) models of P V + N P − P IN D (≡ CP V ) can be considered as a Kripke model of IP V whose underlying accessibility relation has order type ω (the proof is very similar to the one for Theorem 1.5. Also see [B2] ). So, by a proof like the proof of Proposition 1.9, the union of the worlds in it should satisfy P V + coN P − IN D. Hence, this union should satisfy P V + N P − P IN D since P V + coN P − P IN D ≡ c P V + N P − P IN D. This shows that CP V is an inductive theory. Hence, using the well-known characterization of the inductive theories (see e.g. [CK, Th. 3.2.3] ), CP V should be ∀ 2 . So, using ∀ 2 -conservativity of CP V over P V 1 (see [B1, Th. 5.3.6 and Coro. 6.4 .8]), we get CP V ≡ P V 1 .
Note that, the notation ≡ c above, is used to denote equivalence in classical logic. We have to use this notation when we do not have specific names for theories at hand. The same is true about ≡ i . Note that the above proof actually shows that IP V + coN P −P IN D unless CP V = P V 1 . The theory IP V + which was introduced by Buss [B2] apparently is stronger than IP V and is sound and complete with respect to CP V -normal Kripke structures. [CU, Theorem 2.4(i) ]) and the above mentioned result in [KPT] .
